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Abstract 
We examine the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) target choices. We offer evidence that CSR performance of firms matter for M&A 
acquirers. Indeed, our results based on 608 deals between 2003 and 2014 reveal that target 
firms have on average higher CSR scores than similar non-target firms. We also show directly 
that a firm’s CSR is positively associated with its propensity to become a M&A target. These 
results hold for all CSR dimensions (environment, social, and governance). Overall, our results 
suggest that CSR matters in M&A decisions.  
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, Mergers and acquisitions, Matched-pair analysis, 
Logistic regression 
JEL Classification: G30, G34, M14 
 
1. Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR, hereafter) has been discussed in academic studies for 
decades. Existing studies have mainly focused on the impact of CSR on market valuation (Ferrell 
et al., 2016; Buchanan et al., 2018), firm risk (Godfrey et al., 2009), financial performance 
(Flammer, 2015) and asset allocation choices (Cumming and Johan, 2007). A few authors have 
tried to study CSR within the framework of mergers and acquisitions (M&A, hereafter) 
transactions. Aktas et al. (2011) study how M&A announcement returns are affected by the 
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CSR engagement of target firms and report a positive association between target CSR and M&A 
wealth creation. They explain this result arguing that acquirers learn from targets' CSR 
practices, and that more synergistic deals occur with targets that exhibit better CSR 
performance. More recently, Gomes and Marsat (2018) find that the CSR performance of target 
firms is positively related to M&A bid premiums, implying acquirers positively value the CSR 
engagement of targets. This is in line with the resource-based view (RBV, hereafter) of the firm 
which suggests a firm’s competitive advantage results from its ability to generate capabilities 
that are valuable and inimitable (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). Because good relationships 
with stakeholders (proxied by CSR ratings) are hard to develop, high CSR performance can 
potentially provide a basis for the type of resource that serves as a source of competitive 
advantage under the RBV of the firm. Indeed, according to some authors, CSR activities can 
help firms develop valuable intangible assets such as know-how, corporate culture, and 
reputation (Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003), which can in turn provide many benefits such 
as increased customer loyalty (Fombrun et al., 2000) or the ability to attract and retain valuable 
employees (Turban and Greening, 1997). To the extent that CSR activities can be the source of 
intangible assets and impact firms' characteristics, it follows that they should have an impact 
on their appeal to potential acquirers. 
 Our study differs from the existing literature on the impact of targets’ CSR in M&A in 
the following ways. First of all, while M&A announcement returns convey information about 
how the market perceives shareholder value generation/destruction resulting from a deal, the 
choice of a target reflects how the acquirer’s management team value the acquisition of a 
particular target. Second, the relationship between bid premiums and target CSR can partly 
convey an impact of CSR on the price paid for the target but not on target choice. Indeed, it 
could be possible that CSR be used as a lever in negotiating the terms of a deal once the target 
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is picked, rather than actually driving target choice. Focusing on target choice rather than price 
paid allows us to determine whether CSR influences the strategic decision of picking a target. 
 To the best of our knowledge, no study has attempted to determine whether CSR 
performance impacts the choice of target firms in M&A deals. In this paper, we address this 
question by studying 608 M&A deals over the 2003-2014 period. We use pair-matching 
techniques (propensity score matching) in order to compare target firms with similar non-
target firms and find that target firms feature on average higher CSR scores than comparable 
non-target firms. We also make use of logistic regression analysis and find a positive association 
between a firm’s CSR and its propensity to become a M&A target. These results hold for all 
dimensions of CSR (environment, social, and governance). 
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 then introduces 
our tests and empirical findings. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
2.1. Measuring CSR 
To measure CSR, we use data provided by Thomson Reuters ASSET4. The ASSET4 database 
includes 5,000 global publicly listed companies and provides history up to fiscal year 2002 for 
close to 1,000 companies. Specifically, in year t, a firm is assigned a z-score for each of the CSR 
dimensions (environment and social), benchmarking its performance against the rest of the 
firms based on all the information available in fiscal year t-1. The resulting percentage is 
therefore a relative measure of performance, z-scored and normalized to be comprised 
between 0 and 100%. In this study, for each deal we use the last available ASSET4 scores before 
the announcement date. Following Cheng et al. (2014), we compute a firm’s overall CSR score 
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(CSR) by averaging the scores assigned to the environmental, social, and governance 
dimensions1. 
 
2.2. Sample selection 
We derive our sample in multiple steps. We download a list of international deals over the 
2003-2014 period from Thomson Reuters Financial SDC Platinum database. In line with most 
studies, we select all offers where the bidder initially owns less than 50% of the target firm and 
seeks to acquire more than 50% of the target firm. We then merge this list of deals with the 
ASSET4 database and remove the deals for which we do not have CSR scores for the target. We 
then remove deals occurring in non-developed countries because of the small number of 
potential control firms. Finally, we merge this sample with the Thomson Reuters Datastream 
database to get the necessary control variables. We follow standard practice and exclude deals 
involving financial firms. Our final sample contains 608 deals2. Table 1 shows the description of 
our sample of deals. Panel A reports sample distribution across years, Panel B reports sample 
distribution across countries and Panel C reports sample distribution across industries. Our 
sample includes deals occurring in 15 developed countries3 over the 2003-2014 period. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
                                                          
1 Appendix A contains a description of the environment, social, and governance factors, as outlined in the ASSET4 
documentation. 
2 Sample size is constrained by the availability of ASSET4 ratings. It is certainly true that the firms covered by 
ASSET4 are not a random sample of all firms, and we acknowledge this potential limitation. However, the ASSET4 
universe includes most of the largest companies worldwide with a coverage including FTSE 250, S&P 500, NASDAQ 
100, DJ STOXX, Russell 1000, S&P ASX 200 and MSCI World indices. It means our results do have implications for 
understanding how such large companies operate and make acquisition decisions (as large firms are taken over 
by other large firms). 
3 To address potential heterogeneity concerns, we have also conducted our study focusing on US firms only (242 
deals). Results are similar to those presented in this paper and are not reported due to limited space. They are 
available upon request. 
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3.1. Propensity score matching 
We now turn to the problem of building a control (non-target) sample, and in particular to the 
problem of determining characteristics on which control and target samples should be 
matched. The procedure used to create the control group varies and is often based on a single 
variable such as size (Hasbrouck, 1985). Traditional dimension-by-dimension matching may 
potentially not yield good ex-ante matches because of a multi-dimensional matching problem, 
which makes it difficult to match simultaneously on multiple dimensions. To overcome 
potential selection biases resulting from the multi-dimensional matching problem, this paper 
employs a treatment-effect methodology.  Specifically, we use a propensity score matching 
(PSM, hereafter) approach. PSM combines all the covariate information into estimated 
treatment probabilities, known as propensity scores, and use this single continuous covariate 
as the matching variable (Rosenbum and Rubin, 1985). We employ PSM using three different 
matching techniques: (1) nearest-neighbor (NN), (2) kernel4, and (3) local linear regressions 
(LLR). These matching procedures ensure that control firms (i.e., non-targets) are as similar as 
possible to the treated firms (i.e., targets) ex ante. 
Based on prior literature on takeover likelihood (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 1997), we use 
the following matching variables: firm size (log of total assets), leverage (total debt/total 
assets), liquidity (current assets/current liabilities), valuation (market-to-book ratio), tangibility 
(tangible assets/total assets), profitability (return on equity), growth (sales growth), and free 
cash-flow (operating cash flow/total assets). The variables definitions are detailed in Table 2. In 
addition, we also control for year, country, and industry5. 
 
                                                          
4 Specifically, we use an Epanechnikov kernel. 
5 We use 2-digit SIC codes. 
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3.2. Preliminary analysis 
Descriptive statistics of target and control firms are presented in Table 3. The average firm size 
is $3.3 billion (=e14.995). A typical sample firm has a total debt to asset ratio of 25.4%, a market-
to-book ratio of 2.77 and a return on equity of 10.1%. 
 
 
Table 1 
Sample description 
 Deals Proportion (%) 
Panel A. Distribution across years 
2003 5 0.82 
2004 6 0.99 
2005 14 2.30 
2006 53 8.72 
2007 59 9.70 
2008 56 9.21 
2009 40 6.58 
2010 69 11.35 
2011 82 13.49 
2012 81 13.32 
2013 62 10.20 
2014 81 13.32 
 
Panel B. Distribution across countries 
Australia 94 15.46 
Canada 59 9.70 
Finland 6 0.99 
France 8 1.32 
Germany 17 2.80 
Hong Kong 5 0.82 
Japan 24 3.95 
Netherlands 15 2.47 
Norway 5 0.82 
Singapore 5 0.82 
Spain 11 1.81 
Sweden 9 1.48 
Switzerland 6 0.99 
United Kingdom 102 16.78 
United States 242 39.80 
 
Panel C. Distribution across industries (2-digit SIC codes) 
Mineral industries and construction (10-17) 146 24.01 
Manufacturing (20-39) 209 34.38 
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Transportation and communications (40-48) 85 13.98 
Wholesale and retail trade (50-59) 94 15.46 
Service industries (70-89) 74 12.17 
Total 608 100.00 
This table presents our sample distribution across years, countries, and industries. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Variables definition 
Variable Definition 
CSR Overall CSR score computed as the simple average of the environment, 
social, and governance scores. Source: ASSET4 
Environment Environmental score. Source: ASSET4 
Social Social score. Source: ASSET4 
Governance Governance score. Source: ASSET4 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets. Source: Datastream 
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets. Source: Datastream 
Liquidity Current assets divided by current liabilities. Source: Datastream 
MTB Market value of equity over book value of equity. Source: Datastream 
Tangibility Property, plants, and equipment divided by total assets. Source: 
Datastream 
ROE Net income divided by total equity. Source: Datastream 
∆Sales Average sales growth computed over the three years preceding the deal 
offer. Source: Datastream 
FCF Operating cash flows divided by total assets. Source: Datastream 
 
The rest of the descriptive statistics are shown in column 1 of Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
regarding the control groups are presented in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 3. As expected, 
variables mean values for these control groups of non-targets are not statistically different from 
those of the target group (as evidenced by the small values of t-statistics for the difference in 
estimated mean values between control and target groups). 
 
3.3. Results 
Table 4 displays the results of propensity score matching analysis, i.e., the difference in 
CSR performance between target firms and non-target firms that had the closest ex-ante 
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propensities to be targeted according to the set of matching variables. We see that target firms 
have higher CSR scores than similar non-target firms as evidenced by the positive and 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) difference in estimated means. This result holds 
regardless of the matching approach that is used. It shows that target firms have a CSR score 
that is on average 2.7 to 4.3 points higher than similar non-target firms. We also focus on 
individual dimensions of CSR, namely environment, social, and governance. Again, we find that 
target firms features higher scores than similar non-target firms. All results are statistically 
significant at conventional significance levels.  
Table 3 
Financial data for target and control groups 
 Target Control group (NN) Control group 
(Kernel) 
Control group (LLR) 
Variable Mean Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
Size 14.995 14.961 0.42 15.253 -1.16 14.961 0.42 
Leverage 0.254 0.257 -0.34 0.239 1.50 0.257 -0.34 
Liquidity 1.529 1.676 -1.15 1.423 0.95 1.676 -1.15 
MTB 2.777 2.879 -0.65 2.893 -0.73 2.879 -0.65 
Tangibility 0.325 0.309 1.05 0.322 0.16 0.309 1.05 
ROE 0.101 0.100 0.06 0.120 -1.59 0.100 0.06 
∆Sales 0.129 0.124 0.38 0.121 0.64 0.124 0.38 
FCF 0.313 0.285 0.17 0.134 1.24 0.285 0.17 
The table presents mean values for variables used in the matching process. Data is reported for 
target and control groups. T-statistics are for the difference in estimated mean values between 
control and target groups. 
 
Table 4 
CSR difference between target and non-target firms 
 Propensity score matching 
 Nearest-neighbor Kernel Local linear 
regressions 
CSR 4.302*** 2.665*** 3.488*** 
 (3.34) (2.85) (2.71) 
Environment 5.040*** 1.089** 3.998** 
 (2.82) (1.97) (2.25) 
Social 5.100*** 1.590** 4.413*** 
 (3.01) (2.03) (2.61) 
Governance 2.763** 6.331*** 2.061* 
 (2.02) (6.47) (1.90) 
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This table reports the results of pair-matched analysis for CSR measures using propensity score 
matching. Matching is done using nearest-neighbor, kernel, and local linear regression 
approaches. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
3.4. Logistic regression analysis 
In order to better assess the impact of CSR on M&A likelihood, we employ a logistic regression 
(LOGIT) analysis using the entire ASSET4 universe. The dependent variable is a binary variable 
taking the value 1 if a firm becomes a target in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Our analysis 
reveals a positive and statistically significant effect of CSR on the likelihood of becoming a M&A 
target. Results are presented in Table 5. The odds ratios (computed by exponentiating the 
LOGIT coefficients) are 1.0127 for the overall CSR score, 1.0075 for the environment score, 
1.0093 for the social score, and 1.0069 for the governance score. Taking the overall CSR score 
as an illustration, the interpretation is that for each unit-increase in overall CSR score, the 
estimated odds of being subjected to a M&A attempt increases by 1.27%.  All results are 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
3.5. Discussion 
Overall, our results support the idea that CSR attributes of target firms matter for acquiring 
firms and that acquiring firms look for targets that feature good CSR capabilities. Reasons 
underlying the avoidance of low-CSR targets could include the cost and difficulty of bringing a 
target company up to the acquirer’s standards with regards to managing CSR factors6. The 
propensity of acquirers to target high-CSR companies could also be explained by cost savings 
                                                          
6 This was confirmed in a 2012 PRI-PWC survey in which a number of companies stated that their willingness to 
do a deal would be seriously impacted if it appeared to be too difficult or expensive to bring the target company 
up to their own internal standards on ESG factors. Source: The Integration of Environmental, Social and 
Governance Issues in Mergers and Acquisitions Transactions, December 2012, PwC/PRI. 
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linked to energy efficiency, revenue growth from sales of more sustainable products or 
increased reputation and customer loyalty (Fombrun et al., 2000).  
The importance of target CSR for acquirers could also be explained by the risk-reduction 
features of CSR activities7. Increased transparency associated with high governance standards, 
e.g., increased earnings quality and lower level of earnings management (Xie et al., 2003), leads 
to reduced information asymmetry and reduced risk, potentially making high-quality 
governance firms more appealing to prospective buyers. Strong social attributes reduce the 
probability of future labor unrest, which could make potential buyers more comfortable 
regarding post-acquisition outcomes. Finally, strong environmental attributes decrease the 
probability of negative outcomes such as pollution-related hazards, thereby reducing potential 
future claims, litigation costs, and reputation damages. 
 
4. Conclusion 
While prior literature on CSR is extensive, its impact on M&A decisions has been largely 
neglected. In this article, we investigate the issue of whether acquirers account for targets' CSR 
performance when making M&A decisions. Studying a sample of 608 deals over the 2003-2014 
period and making use of propensity score matching analysis, we show conclusive evidence 
that targets' CSR performance matters for acquirers. Specifically, we show that target firms 
feature on average higher CSR scores than similar non-target firms. In addition, we use logistic 
regression analysis and show that  CSR is positively related to the likelihood of being the subject 
of a M&A offer. Our results hold for overall CSR performance as well as for individual CSR 
dimensions (environment, social, and governance).  
                                                          
7 This point is particularly important for M&A acquirers given their undiversified nature. Indeed, M&A acquirers 
are forced to assume a large amount of specific risk because of investment concentration and the high costs 
associated with the divestiture of acquired businesses. 
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 Our findings contribute to the literature by enhancing our understanding of the 
determinants of target choice. Future work could investigate the impact of CSR on target choice 
more deeply by further decomposing CSR performance in order to determine whether some 
key performance indicators (audit committee independence, board membership limits, 
diversity, employee relations…) matter more for acquirers than others. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
CSR and the probability of becoming a target 
 CSR Environment Social Governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -3.017** -3.198** -2.898** -4.153*** 
 (-2.22) (-2.36) (-2.13) (-3.12) 
CSR 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.007** 
 (4.59) (3.90) (4.50) (2.49) 
Size -0.296*** -0.265*** -0.287*** -0.209*** 
 (-5.93) (-5.53) (-5.85) (-4.73) 
Leverage 1.947*** 1.881*** 1.940*** 1.786*** 
 (6.09) (5.93) (6.09) (5.68) 
Liquidity 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.001 
 (0.871) (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) 
MTB -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.077*** -0.070*** 
 (-3.66) (-3.59) (-3.70) (-3.41) 
Tangibility -0.553*** -0.545*** -0.540** -0.535** 
 (-2.62) (-2.59) (-2.57) (-2.55) 
ROE -0.421* -0.403 -0.429* -0.399 
 (-1.69) (-1.62) (-1.73) (-1.61) 
∆Sales 0.258 0.222 0.237 0.142 
 (1.07) (0.92) (0.98) (0.59) 
FCF 1.929 1.842 1.863 1.909 
 (1.12) (1.08) (1.09) (1.11) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,348 20,348 20,348 20,348 
Pseudo-R² 0.065 0.064 0.065 0.063 
This table reports the results of logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable is a binary 
variable taking the value one if a firm becomes a target during a particular year, and zero 
otherwise. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix A. Description of ASSET4 categories (from ASSET4 documents)  
 
Environmental component 
Emission reduction: The emission reduction category measures a company's management 
commitment and effectiveness towards reducing environmental emission in the production 
and operational processes. It reflects a company's capacity to reduce air emissions, waste, 
hazardous waste, water discharges, spills or its impacts on biodiversity and to partner with 
environmental organizations to reduce the environmental impact of the company in the local 
or broader community. 
Product innovation: The product innovation category measures a company's management 
commitment and effectiveness towards supporting the research and development of eco-
efficient products or services. It reflects a company's capacity to reduce the environmental 
costs and burdens for its customers, and thereby creating new market opportunities through 
new environmental technologies and processes or eco-designed, dematerialized products with 
extended durability. 
Resource reduction: The resource reduction category measures a company's management 
commitment and effectiveness towards achieving an efficient use of natural resources in the 
production process. It reflects a company's capacity to reduce the use of materials, energy or 
water, and to find more eco-efficient solutions by improving supply chain management. 
 
Social component 
Customer/Product Responsibility: The customer/product responsibility category measures a 
company's management commitment and effectiveness towards creating value-added 
products and services upholding the customer's security. It reflects a company's capacity to 
maintain its license to operate by producing quality goods and services integrating the 
customer's health and safety, and preserving its integrity and privacy also through accurate 
product information and labelling. 
Society/Community: The society/community category measures a company's management 
commitment and effectiveness towards maintaining the company's reputation within the 
general community (local, national and global). It reflects a company's capacity to maintain its 
license to operate by being a good citizen (donations of cash, goods or staff time, etc.), 
protecting public health (avoidance of industrial accidents, etc.) and respecting business ethics 
(avoiding bribery and corruption, etc.). 
Society/Human Rights: The society/human rights category measures a company's management 
commitment and effectiveness towards respecting the fundamental human rights conventions. 
It reflects a company's capacity to maintain its license to operate by guaranteeing the freedom 
of association and excluding child, forced or compulsory labor. 
Workforce/Diversity and Opportunity: The workforce/diversity and opportunity category 
measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards maintaining 
diversity and equal opportunities in its workforce. It reflects a company's capacity to increase 
its workforce loyalty and productivity by promoting an effective life-work balance, a family 
friendly environment and equal opportunities regardless of gender, age, ethnicity, religion or 
sexual orientation. 
Workforce/Employment Quality: The workforce/employment quality category measures a 
company's management commitment and effectiveness towards providing high-quality 
employment benefits and job conditions. It reflects a company's capacity to increase its 
workforce loyalty and productivity by distributing rewarding and fair employment benefits, and 
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by focusing on long-term employment growth and stability by promoting from within, avoiding 
lay-offs and maintaining relations with trade unions. 
Workforce/Health and Safety: The workforce/health and safety category measures a company's 
management commitment and effectiveness towards providing a healthy and safe workplace. 
It reflects a company's capacity to increase its workforce loyalty and productivity by integrating 
into its day-to-day operations a concern for the physical and mental health, well-being and 
stress level of all employees. 
Workforce /Training and Development: The workforce/training and development category 
measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards providing training 
and development (education) for its workforce. It reflects a company's capacity to increase its 
intellectual capital, workforce loyalty and productivity by developing the workforce's skills, 
competences, employability and careers in an entrepreneurial environment. 
 
Governance component 
Board of Directors/Board Functions: The board of directors/board functions category measures 
a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards following best practice 
corporate governance principles related to board activities and functions. It reflects a 
company's capacity to have an effective board by setting up the essential board committees 
with allocated tasks and responsibilities. 
 
Board of Directors/Board Structure: The board of directors/board structure category measures 
a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards following best practice 
corporate governance principles related to a well-balanced membership of the board. It reflects 
a company's capacity to ensure a critical exchange of ideas and an independent decision-
making process through an experienced, diverse and independent board. 
 
Board of Directors/Compensation Policy: The board of directors/compensation policy category 
measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards following best 
practice corporate governance principles related to competitive and proportionate 
management compensation. It reflects a company's capacity to attract and retain executives 
and board members with the necessary skills by linking their compensation to individual or 
company-wide financial or extra-financial targets. 
 
Integration/Vision and Strategy: The integration/vision and strategy category measures a 
company's management commitment and effectiveness towards the creation of an 
overarching vision and strategy integrating financial and extra-financial aspects. It reflects a 
company's capacity to convincingly show and communicate that it integrates the economic 
(financial), social and environmental dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making processes.   
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